Email authentication

Publish the policy that stops the spoof.

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM to the domain in your From line. Build a record below, or paste one to read every tag back in plain English — including the tags RFC 9989 retired.

Updated

Policy for the domain (p=)

What this policy does

DMARC proves the domain. It does not judge the message.

DMARC authenticates the domain in the From header. It does not score content, weigh sender reputation, or decide whether a message is spam. A message can pass DMARC and still be junk; a legitimate message can fail it through a forwarder, a mailing list, or a sender that signs as the wrong domain.

Passing SPF, DKIM and DMARC proves the mail is yours. It does not prove the mailbox provider wants it. If a legitimate transactional message lands in spam, the usual cause is a gap in SPF, DKIM or the alignment between them — see how to diagnose transactional email landing in spam, which maps the causes to the fixes; this generator builds the DMARC half.

Four policies, one direction

p=none

Monitoring. Collect reports, enforce nothing. A starting point, not a policy.

quarantine

Failing mail is treated as suspicious and usually routed to spam.

reject

Failing mail is refused outright. The end state once reports are clean.

t=y

Testing. Apply one level below the published policy. Replaces pct= in RFC 9989.

DMARC leans on the other two records. Check them with the SPF generator & checker and the domain health check, or run the deeper deliverability audit for MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DANE and blocklists. Folio publishes and maintains all three for custom domains.

What changed in RFC 9989: pct= is removed — use t=y; ri= and rf= are historic; np= sets policy for non-existent subdomains and psd= is for public suffix operators.